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"I HAVE LOVED YOU IN MY DREAMS":
POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION AND THE NEED
FOR CHANGE IN THE UNIFORM
PARENTAGE ACT
Susan C Stevenson-Popp'
In a letter to his children, both those existing and those existing only as
a future possibility, a man writes:
I address this to my children, because, although I have only two,
... it may be that Deborah will decide - as I hope she will - to
have a child by me after my death. I've been assiduously
generating frozen sperm samples for that eventuality. If she
does, then this letter is for my posthumous offspring, as well,
with the thought that I have loved you in my dreams, even though
I never got to see you born.
Today, with the sophisticated nature of alternative reproduction, a
child may have as many as five different "parents."' It is possible for a
sperm donor, an egg donor, a surrogate host, and two non-genetically
related individuals who intend to raise the child all to be considered
' J.D. Candidate, May 2004, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. I would like to thank Professor Helen Alvard for her insight and guidance
throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank my parents, Rita and Bob, who
tirelessly lend their love and support every day.
1. Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis
added). Forty-eight-year-old William E. Kane committed suicide on October 30, 1991 in a
Las Vegas Hotel. Id. at 840. He had been living with thirty-eight-year-old Deborah Hecht
for approximately five years prior to his death. Id. Kane was survived by two college-
aged children from a former marriage. Id. Shortly before his death, Kane deposited
fifteen vials of sperm in a sperm bank. Id. In his will, Kane bequeathed all "right, title,
and interest" in the stored sperm to Hecht. Id. Kane wrote this letter to his children,
Everett and Katy, approximately ten days before he took his life. Id. at 841. The ensuing
legal battle over Kane's sperm is discussed at length in this Comment. See supra text
accompanying notes 63-76. It should be noted, however, that while the Court of Appeal of
California upheld Kane's will bequeathing his sperm to Hecht, this Comment and the
proposed statute address only children conceived posthumously by a wife, using her
deceased husband's sperm. The discussion of Kane's will and the resulting case, Hecht v.
Superior Court, is used primarily to illustrate the importance of the decedent's intent in
determining the rights of posthumously conceived children.
2. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a "Parent"? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 355 (1991); ROBERT
BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES,
AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 99 (1995).
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within this category of "parents."3 This scenario, of course, assumes that
these individuals are alive and active in the process of producing a child.
When a child is conceived using the preserved sperm of a deceased
father, however, that child is called a "posthumous child."4 Through the
3. Hill, supra note 2, at 355; SUSAN LEWIS COOPER & ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER,
CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL AND ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS, excerpt, at http://preconception.com/resources/articles/social.htm (last
visited Apr. 5, 2003). Artificial insemination is the oldest and most common form of
assisted reproductive technology, as well as one of the easiest and least expensive
techniques. PAUL LAURITZEN, PURSUING PARENTHOOD: ETHICAL ISSUES IN ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION 3 (1993); Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A Twinkle in a Decedent's
Eye. Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive
Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 337 (1994); Stacey Sutton, Note, The Real Sexual
Revolution: Posthumously Conceived Children, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 857, 861 (1999).
The process involves using a pipette to insert sperm into a woman's uterus while she is
ovulating. Sutton, supra, at 862. The procedure does not require assistance from a
physician but is usually performed by one. Id. When the sperm comes from the woman's
husband, the process is termed Artificial Insemination by Husband (AIH); when the
sperm comes from a third-party donor, it is called Artificial Insemination by Donor
(AID). Id. at 863. The sperm used in the procedure may or may not be previously frozen.
Id. at 863-64. This Comment addresses only issues surrounding AIH.
4. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm" The
Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 231 n.19 (1987). Posthumous
conception by a man's wife using her husband's frozen sperm is perhaps the least ethically
problematic form of posthumous conception because, arguably, it promotes the idea of
family. See Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent. A Dialogue on Postmortem
Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HoUs. L. REV. 967, 1013 (1,996)
("In its least problematic form-the desire of a wife to honor her love for a recently
deceased husband by producing their child-artificial conception strikes me as supportive,
even expressive, of the idea of a family."). There are those who argue that posthumous
conception is not in the best interests of the child. See Andrea V. Corvalan, Comment,
Fatherhood After Death: A Legal and Ethical Analysis of Posthumous Reproduction, 7
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 335, 362-63 (1997). Corvalan quotes John Stuart Mill: "To bring a
child into existence without fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its
body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the
unfortunate offspring and against society." Id. at 336. The psychological burden to a child
who is a product of posthumous reproduction is not fully known. See American Society of
Reproductive Medicine Website [hereinafter ASRM Website] at http://www.asrm.org/
Media/Ethics/posthum.html (Jan. 10, 1997). The ASRM states:
[T]he child at birth would be subject to the burden of having lost one genetic
parent . . . . When reproduction takes place as a consequence of a loving
relationship in which both partners were desirous of children, but a pregnancy is
frustrated by the death of one partner, posthumous reproduction would
ordinarily be well accepted both socially and culturally.
Id. The question has been raised, however, whether starting a family is prudent if death is
anticipated. Id. Some claim that a child could be psychologically harmed by learning that
he was conceived by a dead man; it is, however, noted that the psychological impact in this
situation is arguably similar to that of any child raised without a father. Honorable Janet
J. Berry, Life After Death: Preservation of the Immortal Seed, 72 TUL. L. REV. 231, 253
(1997). Still others argue that it should be recognized that any child born of assisted
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use of advanced reproductive technology, children have been born using
sperm up to ten years after the sperm was originally preserved.5 This
process of storing sperm for later use has provided women with the
ability to conceive children even after circumstances occur that would
normally preclude them from conceiving children with their mates, such
as their mates' sterility or death.6
reproductive technologies would favor the decision of the parent(s) to use those methods;
otherwise, the child would not exist. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 2, at 100-01.
5. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 234. The process of freezing eggs, sperm,
or embryos in liquid nitrogen for future use is called "cryopreservation." GEOFFREY
SHER ET AL., IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: THE A.R.T. OF MAKING BABIES 198 (1998). At
normal body temperature, sperm can last twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Gloria J.
Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security Survivor's
Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 270 (1999).
When sperm is frozen at temperatures as low as minus 100 degrees Celsius, it may be
preserved for ten years or more. Id. Cryopreservation is the procedure that makes
posthumously conceived children possible. Sutton, supra note 3, at 870. The process of
freezing sperm was apparently discovered in 1866 by Montegazza, an Italian scientist.
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 234. Montegazza proposed that frozen sperm
banks could be used by widows whose husbands were killed in war. Id. In 1949, it was
discovered that the addition of glycerol before freezing increased the chances that the
sperm would survive the process. Id.
It is now medically possible to retrieve sperm from terminally ill or recently deceased
males for the purpose of posthumous reproduction. ASRM Website, supra note 4. This
procedure has raised a host of new issues relating to reproductive autonomy and death
and is beyond the scope of this Comment.
6. The procedure of artificial insemination has been performed on animals for
centuries. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 234. The first known successful
artificial insemination of a human was performed in England in 1770 by a surgeon named
John Hunter. Id. The practice first occurred in the United States much later. Id. In 1866,
a physician named Marion Simms successfully inseminated a woman artificially. Id.
Rather than being praised for his accomplishment, however, Simms' actions were met with
disdain. Id. The unnatural manner of the pregnancy was not in agreement with the moral
and religious beliefs of the time. Id.
A woman's eggs may also be cryopreserved for future use. THE NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 298 (1998); BLANK &
MERRICK, supra note 2, at 88. Practice differs from that of retrieval of cryopreserved
sperm, however, because it requires the involvement of an additional female party to
gestate the fertilized eggs and carry them to term. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE
ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra, at 298. The subject is therefore beyond the scope of this
Comment.
One ethical question that is inevitably raised in the context of assisted reproduction is
whether it is morally wrong to create a child using assisted reproduction when there are
many children in the world who are alive and in need of homes. See COOPER & GLAZER,
supra note 3; see also REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
30 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995) (discussing some of the advantages and drawbacks to
adoption as compared with conceiving a child using assisted reproductive technologies);
see also Berry, supra note 4, at 231 (calling a child born to a woman who has lost her
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The issue of whether a posthumously born child is considered a child
of a deceased parent is relevant mainly in the context of inheritance and
benefit eligibility.7 Existing statutory law does not recognize a man who
has preserved his sperm, for any of a variety of reasons, and dies before
that sperm is used to conceive a child as a "father., 8 Lacking adequate
statutory direction, courts are unsettled, unsure of how to apply
traditional common law principles to evolving reproductive technology.
husband or lover and uses assisted reproductive technologies to create the child a
"souvenir baby").
7. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at
341; Sutton, supra note 3, at 860-61, 914 (noting that the issues surrounding posthumously
conceived children can be separated into two categories: rights prior to gestation,
including rights to the reproductive material, and rights after gestation, including the right
of the child to inherit, as well as custody issues). See generally Banks, supra note 5, and
notes 95, 97, and 133 infra (discussing Social Security survivor's benefits for posthumously
conceived children).
& See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2000) (amended 2002); UNIF. STATUS OF
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4 (1988); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4
(1973); see also THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note
6, at 359 (recommending that New York adopt the provision of the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act, which provides that a man who dies before a child is
conceived, using his sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child). But cf RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. 1 (1999).
The RESTATEMENT supports the view that a child conceived by artificial insemination of a
wife using her deceased husband's sperm, if born within a reasonable time after the
husband's death, should be treated as the husband's child for purposes of inheritance from
the husband. Id.
9. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 262 (Mass. 2002). The
United States Supreme Court has not directly considered the constitutional issues
surrounding children who are posthumously conceived using a deceased husband's sperm.
Robert J. Kerekes, My Child... But Not My Heir. Technology, the Law, and Post-Mortem
Conception, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213, 227 (1996). In Skinner v. Oklahoma,
however, the Court declared procreation to be "one of the basic civil rights of man" and
"fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER
WIr, THE SUPREME COURT & INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 298 (1997) (citing Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). It has been argued, however, that before traditional
views about reproductive autonomy are applied to posthumous reproduction, as well as
other forms of assisted reproduction, it is necessary to determine whether these methods
involve the same ethical considerations as does traditional coital reproduction and what
value is to be given to the methods. See generally John A. Robertson, Symposium
Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics: Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027 (1994).
Robertson notes:
The most difficult-and hence revealing-questions about procreative autonomy
and the right to reproduce arise as we move away from the dominant cultural
paradigm of a married couple conceiving offspring by coital reproduction. When
reproduction occurs noncoitally through in vitro fertilization or with the aid of
donors and surrogates, an initial question is whether the interests and values that
make coital reproduction a valued activity apply at all. If the same procreative
interests are implicated, then noncoital, collaborative reproduction should be
protected to the same extent as coital reproduction. Because each noncoital
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In January of 2001, however, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts handed down the landmark decision, Woodward v.
Commissioner of Social Security.'° The court determined that, under
certain circumstances, a child conceived through artificial insemination
with a husband's sperm after the man's death could be considered the
man's "issue" and could inherit from the man under state intestacy law.1
This decision marks a significant departure from prior case law and
clearly shuns existing statutory law pertaining to posthumously conceived
children."2 Given the new issues arising regarding posthumously
situation differs in some respect from the married coital model, however, a
separate normative judgment must be made about the relative importance of the
variation. The prevailing paradigm of procreative autonomy should control only
after the interests and values at stake in coital reproduction are identified, and
the extent to which they exist in the disputed noncoital situation is determined.
Unless we are prepared to protect every exercise of procreative autonomy
regardless of the precise choice being made, a prior normative judgment about the
importance of the interests at stake must first be made. Autonomy cannot be the
sole guide in answering this question ....
Id. at 1029-30 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Robertson further notes that because
posthumous reproduction, by definition, involves a deceased person, its value and
meaning lie in the importance that individuals place on being able to direct the use of their
gametes after death. Id. at 1031. An important question should be whether these values
are as significant in the context of posthumous reproduction as they are in other
reproductive experiences. Id. Reproduction is ordinarily "valued because of the genetic,
gestational, and child-rearing experiences involved .... [It] connects individuals with
future generations and provides personal experiences of great moment in large part
because persons reproducing see and have contact with offspring, or are at least aware
that they exist." Id. A deceased person, whose gametes are used for posthumous
reproduction, however, will not gestate, rear, or even know that he has reproduced
genetically. Id. Robertson argues that this version of the experiences that normally make
reproduction valuable is so attenuated that, arguably, it could be considered a
reproductive experience of small importance and should not receive the high respect given
to traditional reproductive experiences. Id. at 1032. Robertson also notes that the desire
to make directives against posthumous reproduction are not equal to those values
associated with the desire to avoid reproduction during life. Id. No unwanted gestation or
child-rearing would occur, and the person will never know that he had offspring. Id.
Robertson argues that before a person's reproductive autonomy can be allowed to control
posthumous reproduction, it must be determined whether posthumous reproduction
implicates the same interests, values, and concerns that traditional coital reproduction
entails. Id. at 1031.
10. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
11. Id. at 272; see infra Part I.D and accompanying notes (discussing the Woodward
case); infra Part III (proposing a revision to the UPA dealing with the status of
posthumously conceived children, based on the reasoning and requirements set forth in
Woodward and the supporting reasons and policy for this change).
12. The UPA represents the current legislative view on the status of posthumously
conceived children. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2000) (amended 2002). The Act,
however, has been adopted in only a few states. The first Uniform Parentage Act and the
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act have been adopted by a larger
number of states. None of these acts provides adequate protection for a child conceived
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conceived children, the time has come to reexamine and modify statutory
law in light of the Woodward decision, in an attempt to provide greater
protection for these children in certain situations.
This Comment examines the traditional common law view of
posthumously conceived children and the changes in statutory and case
law that have developed in response to new trends in assisted
reproductive technologies. Next, this Comment analyzes Woodward and
discusses its new approach to the issue of posthumously conceived
children. This Comment also addresses the need for statutory law
change in response to issues such as those raised in the Woodward case.
This Comment then sets forth proposed changes to the Uniform
Parentage Act, inspired by and derived partly from the Woodward
opinion. It also addresses the advantages of changing statutory
treatment of posthumously conceived children and the inevitable
protests and dangers that could follow from these changes. Finally, this
Comment concludes with a look toward the future, predicting the
problems that courts will encounter, and the path of change that will
inevitably come, as more cases like Woodward present themselves unless
changes are made in existing statutory law.
Although there are extensive ethical and moral considerations that
must be weighed in determining whether to allow a posthumous child to
inherit from a deceased parent under these circumstances, 3 this
Comment primarily addresses the need for legal change in this area. The
children currently born under these circumstances should not be
neglected by the law while the ethical considerations surrounding their
births are debated at length. A uniform system of guidance is needed
now to allow the courts, when appropriate, to afford these children
much-needed legal rights.
posthumously by a wife, using her deceased husband's sperm. See infra Parts I.B.1-3 and
accompanying notes (discussing the inadequacies of the existing Uniform Acts in
protecting the rights of the posthumously conceived child); infra Part IlI (proposing a
statutory amendment to the UPA, which would provide greater protection to these
children).
13. See supra notes 4 and 6 (discussing some of the ethical issues associated with
posthumous reproduction); see also Robertson, supra note 9, at 1031. Robertson argues
that before traditional moral and ethical values are applied to posthumous reproduction, it
must first be determined whether these reproductive methods should be given the same
value as traditional reproduction. Id.
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I. PRIOR AND EXISTING LAW RELATING TO POSTHUMOUSLY
CONCEIVED CHILDREN
A. Determining Heirs at the Date of Death: The Common Law
Approach to Intestacy
An "heir" is "a person who, under the laws of intestacy, is entitled to
receive an intestate decedent's property. 1 4  When an individual dies
without a will, the state intestacy statute provides the formula for
distributing the decedent's estate. 5 Every state intestacy statute provides
that, if a decedent leaves "issue," the issue will receive a portion of the
decedent's estate.16 "Issue" are an individual's descendants or those who
follow in the decedent's lineage. 7 Under common law, heirs were fixed
at the date of the decedent's death. 8 The exception to the rule was that
children who were in gestation at the date of the father's death, and who
were born within the probable gestation period, could inherit as the
decedent's issue.' 9 This approach is still followed in most jurisdictions,
14. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 727 (7th ed. 1999). An individual does not have
heirs until death. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 131, 714 (6th ed. 2000). Prior to death, an individual has only "heirs apparent,"
or those who are expected to receive the person's property upon death. Id. at 131.
15. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 14, at 71-72; see also UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-101 (2002) ("Any part of a decedent's estate not effectively disposed of by will
passes by intestate succession to the decedent's heirs as prescribed in this Code, except as
modified by the decedent's will.").
16. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (2002) ("Any part of the intestate estate not
passing to the decedent's surviving spouse under Section 2-102, or the entire intestate
estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals
designated below who survive the decedent: (1) to the decedent's descendants by
representation ... ").
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 455,836.
18. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 262 (Mass. 2002)
(acknowledging the common law rule but holding that, under certain circumstances, a
child conceived through the use of artificial insemination with a husband's sperm after his
death could be considered a child of the husband for purposes of inheritance).
19. Id. at 262 n.10. Under common law, it is presumed that a child born to a married
woman after her husband is dead but within 280 days of the husband's death is the
legitimate child of the husband, and the child is entitled to intestate succession rights.
Christopher A. Scharman, Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1009 (2002). The Uniform
Parentage Act extends this presumption to 300 days. Id. The 280- or 300-day period is an
estimated measure of typical gestation and intends to protect the father's estate from
fraudulent claims. Id. This presumption protects the rights of children in gestation at the
time of a father's death; however, posthumous children, by definition, may include
children born well after the 280- or 300-day presumptive period; these children cannot be
deemed legal heirs and are denied intestate inheritance rights from the deceased parent's
estate. Id.; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1990) ("An individual in gestation at a
particular time is treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more
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and it has been adopted in several influential uniform laws; however,
because children conceived posthumously are not in gestation at the date
of one parent's death, they are not protected under the common law
rule.0
B. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act and the
Uniform Parentage Acts (Old and New)
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has repeatedly addressed the subject of nonmarital children.2' In 1973,
the Conference approved the Uniform Parentage Act, which attempted
to treat parents and children equally regardless of the marital status of
the parents2 The Act was subsequently adopted in nineteen states, with
portions of the Act enacted in other states. In 1988, the Conference
adopted the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act,
which was intended to promote equal treatment for children conceived
by non-traditional methods2 Most recently, in 2000, the Conference
after birth."); Kerekes, supra note 9, at 214-15 (noting that new technologies have left
legislative and judicial remedies far behind in the area of posthumously born children).
20. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(3) (2000) (amended 2002); UNIF.
STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4(b) (1988); UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 4(a)(1) (1973).
21. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2000) (amended 2002); Laura
Wish Morgan, The New Uniform Parentage Act (2000): Parenting for the Millennium (Apr.
2001), at http://www.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art200104.html.
22. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2000) (amended 2002); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973).
23. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2000) (amended 2002). The 1973
Uniform Parentage Act was adopted in the following states: Alabama, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming.
See Uniform Matrimonial, Family, and Health Laws Locator, at http://www.law.cornell.
edu/uniform/vol9.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
24. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT prefatory note
(1988). In the prefatory note, the Conference noted that extraordinary progress in
medical technology has produced miracles. Id. According to the Conference, these
miracles "are here to stay," and "[o]nce out, the genie will never return to the bottle." Id
The Conference further stated:
This Conference is faced with the birth of many beautiful, innocent children
brought into the world through certain extraordinary procedures which will
ultimately require regulation, but meanwhile the status of these children
demands our attention. These children are without traditional heritage, or
parentage and other fundamentals; they are buffeted by forces beyond their
comprehension and control. Although without guile or fault, but because of
accident of birth, these children of the new biology have been deprived of certain
basic rights.
Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 32-49 and 145-50 (discussing the inadequacies of
the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, and the acts following it, as
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integrated and expanded the two previous acts to produce the Uniform
Parentage Act." The Conference recommended that the two previous
acts be withdrawn, and the new act be the Conference's only model
statute addressing parentage. 6 Noting the country's "high nonmarital
birthrate," the Conference stated that its main goal is "protecting the
child, who had no voice in often-complex circumstances giving rise to the
child's birth.""V
1. The First Uniform Parentage Act
The First Uniform Parentage Act's goal was to provide equal
treatment for "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children under the law."'
The Act adopts the common law view that a man is presumed to be a
child's natural father if "he and the child's natural mother are or have
been married to each other, and the child is born during the marriage, or
within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment,
declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation is
entered by a court."29  The Act contains one section pertaining to
artificial insemination, which deals only with artificial insemination of a
woman with sperm other than her husband's, and donation of a man's
sperm for use by a woman other than his wife.0 The Act does not
specifically address a wife's use of her husband's sperm to conceive a
child after his death.31 The Conference eventually addressed this issue in
1988, when it produced the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act.3 2
they apply to children posthumously conceived by a wife using her deceased husband's
preserved sperm).
25. See Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Uniform Parentage Act Revised (Aug. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/pr8-3-00-3.asp.
26. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2000) (amended 2002).
27. Id.
28. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973). A "legitimate child" is
defined as, "[a]t common law, a child born or begotten in lawful wedlock ... [and
m]odernly, a child born or begotten in lawful wedlock or legitimized by the parents' later
marriage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 232. An "illegitimate child" is
defined as "[a] child that was neither born nor begotten in lawful wedlock nor later
legitimized." Id. Because marriage necessarily ends at death, "posthumously conceived
children are always nonmarital children." Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d
257, 266-67 (Mass. 2002).
29. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973).
30. See id. § 5.
31. See generally id.
32 See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 1(1)(ii)
(1988).
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2. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA)
The self-stated purpose of the USCACA is "to effect the security and
well-being of those children born and living in our midst as a result of
assisted conception."33 The prefatory note explains the strong preference
of the Conference to provide a child with two parents; thus, the Act
establishes a presumption of paternity in the husband of a married
woman who conceives a child through assisted conception. 4 The burden
is placed on the husband to establish lack of consent to paternity.35
Although the USCACA states, in the section entitled "Assisted
Conception By Married Woman," that presumptive paternity in the
husband of a married woman who conceives a child through assisted
conception "reflects a concern for the best interests of the children of
assisted conception," in the next section of the Act, an individual whose
sperm is used to conceive a posthumous child is excluded from the group
afforded parental status.37 The USCACA provides: "An individual who
dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived
other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg or
sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child."" The comment to this
section explains that the provision seeks to provide finality in the
determination of parenthood; it also states that parenthood of these
individuals ends at their death.39 This is the only provision in the
USCACA pertaining to procreation by a married couple.4° The stated
intention of the provision is to avoid problems with intestate succession
that might arise if posthumous use of a person's genetic material allows
the person to be considered a parent4 The Act, however, does provide
one alternative to this result: an individual may provide in his will for
33. Id. prefatory note.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. § 3 cmt.
37. Id. § 4.
3& Id. (emphasis added). See Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way To Be Born?
Legislative Inaction and the Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 993, 1016-17 (1996).
Mika and Hurst argue that this section of the USCACA does not satisfactorily address the
status of a child born to a widow through artificial insemination. Id. On one hand, it can
be argued that the child should be considered legitimate because the sperm was preserved
during the marriage; thus, it is the husband's sperm with which the widow would be
inseminated. Id. On the other hand, it can be argued that the child should not be
considered legitimate because the husband is deceased and the marriage terminated; thus,
at the time of insemination, the widow is inseminated with the sperm of a man who is no
longer her husband. Id.
39. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION AcT § 4 cmt. (1988).
40. See id.
41. Id. § 4 cmt.
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children posthumously conceived.42 The USCACA has been adopted in
only two states, North Dakota and Virginia 3
3. The New Uniform Parentage Act
With the 2000 version of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), the
Conference expanded and attempted to replace both the 1973 Uniform
Parentage Act and the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act.44 Once again, the Conference adopted the common law
view that a child in gestation at the time of the husband's death creates a
presumption of paternity.' Article 7, entitled "Child of Assisted
Reproduction," pertains to children conceived by means other than
sexual intercourse. 46 The UPA provides that if a husband provides sperm
for, or consents to, his wife's use of the sperm, he is the father of a
resulting child.47 Section 707 specifically addresses the parental status of
42. Id.
43. The provision in the North Dakota Code that is based on the USCACA provides:
"A person who dies before a conception using that person's sperm or egg is not a parent of
any resulting child born of the conception." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-1.8-04(2) (Michie
1997). The portion of the Virginia provision based on the USCACA provides:
Any child resulting from the insemination of a wife's ovum using her husband's
sperm, with his consent, is the child of the husband and wife notwithstanding
that, during the ten-month period immediately preceding the birth, either party
died.
However, any person who dies before in utero implantation of an embryo
resulting from the union of his sperm or her ovum with another gamete, whether
or not the gamete is that of the person's spouse, is not the parent of any resulting
child unless (i) implantation occurs before notice of the death can reasonably be
communicated to the physician performing the procedure or (ii) the person
consents to be a parent in writing executed before the implantation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2002); see also Scharman, supra note 19,
at 1011-12. Scharman notes that Virginia's version of the USCACA contains one very
important difference from the original Act: the Virginia statute allows a deceased parent
to "affirmatively claim a legal relationship with the child if he 'consents to be a parent in
writing executed before the implantation."' Id. at 1012. This provision allows a person to
claim legal status as a parent of a posthumous child by expressing his intent in writing
while still alive. Id. This provides little protection to the child, however, because it does
not allow the posthumous child to receive intestate inheritance rights. Id.
44. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2000) (amended 2002).
45. Id. § 204. Section 204 provides: "A man is presumed to be the father of a child if.
he and the mother of the child were married to each other and the child is born within
300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce[, or after a decree of separation] ... ." Id.
46. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 (2002) (amended 2002). The Uniform Parentage
Act defines "assisted reproduction" as "a method of causing pregnancy other than sexual
intercourse. The term includes: (A) intrauterine insemination; (B) donation of eggs; (C)
donation of embryos; (D) in-vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; [and] (E)
intracytoplasmic sperm injection." Id. § 102.
47. Id. § 703.
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a deceased spouse, stating that "[i]f an individual who consented in a
record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before placement of
eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual
would be a parent of the child." 4  The UPA applies only to the
determination of parentage; however, a determination of parentage can
significantly affect determinations involving benefits and inheritance. 49
C. Judicial Treatment of Posthumous Reproduction Cases
Courts have had few opportunities to address the rights of
posthumously conceived children."' Of the existing cases, however, a few
should be noted for their treatment of these issues.
Parpalaix v. CECOS brought to light the issues of posthumous
insemination and paved the way for American courts that would later
consider the issue.' In Parpalaix, the French Tribunal de grand instance
ordered the Centre d'Etude at de Conservation du Sperme (CECOS), a
government-run sperm bank, to deliver stored sperm of a decedent to the
doctor of his surviving wife.52 Alain Parpalaix had deposited his sperm at
CECOS after learning he suffered from testicular cancer, but he left no
instructions regarding future use of the sperm.53 As his condition
48. Id. § 707.
49. Id. § 103 cmt. (noting that the UPA was amended to apply only to determinations
of parentage due to concern that the previous version was overbroad and could interfere
with other state laws).
50. Scharman, supra note 19, at 1013 (urging the "importance of establishing legal
standards for determining the rights of posthumous children").
51. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 229-33 (citing the GAZETTE DU PALAIS,
Sep. 1.5, 1984, at 11-14, as their source of information on Parpalaix but leaving it unclear as
to whether this is an official or unofficial report of the case).
52. Id. at 233.
53. Id. at 229-30. The chemotherapy procedures associated with testicular cancer are
designed to kill germ cells, which presents the risk of infertility to those who undergo the
procedures. See Testicular Cancer Resource Center Fertility Page, at http://tcrc.
acor.org/fertility.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2003). Germ cells generate sperm; thus, once a
male has finished chemotherapy treatment, his sperm count is likely to be considerably
lower than it was prior to the chemotherapy. Id. Though sperm levels will eventually
return to normal in some men, in others, the sperm will not return. Id. The Website
explains: "Because of the high probability of an indefinite period of infertility following
chemotherapy, we strongly recommend that men facing chemotherapy bank some sperm
before starting treatments." Id.; see also Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 235
(explaining that men who fear sterility as a result of disease, chemotherapy, or exposure to
hazardous substances, as well as men who have undergone vasectomies but wish to retain
the option of having children, may be wise to preserve sperm; the frozen sperm is a so-
called "fertility insurance").
2003] Posthumous Reproduction and the Uniform Parentage Act 739
deteriorated, he married his girlfriend, Corinne, and soon after, he died.'
Corinne requested the sperm from CECOS, but CECOS denied her
request.55 The sperm bank argued that its legal obligation was solely to
the donor and that sperm was an indivisible part of the body, which was
not inheritable unless a decedent left clear instructions. The French
court refused to apply contract principles to the case; it also refused to
characterize sperm as an indivisible part of the body.57 Instead, the court
said that sperm was "the seed of life.., tied to the fundamental liberty of
a human being to conceive or not to conceive."5 The court explained
that the future of the sperm should be decided by the person from whom
it came; thus, the deciding issue is intent. The court examined Alain's
intent to determine whether that intent could be considered
"unequivocable."'  Based on the testimony of Corinne and Alain's
parents, the court concluded that Alain had a strong desire for his wife to
be the mother of their child.6 Less than ten years later, an American
54. Scharman, supra note 19, at 1014 (calling Parpalaix the "case that ushered in the
post-mortem insemination era").
55. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 230; see also Corvalan, supra note 4, at
340. Corinne and the Parpalaix family relied on two arguments in attempting to establish
that they were heirs and owners of the sperm. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at
230. First, they argued that Alain's sperm was moveable property, and, thus, inheritable.
Id. Second, they maintained that Corinne had a moral right to the sperm because Alain
married Corinne only shortly before his death with the intent for her to use the sperm to
have children after his death. Id.
56. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 231. CECOS also argued that depositing
Alain's sperm had been "purely therapeutic" and that courts should not extend that
therapy to posthumous reproduction. Corvalan, supra note 4, at 340-41.
57. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 232.
58. Id. (quoting the GAZETTE DU PALAIS, Sept. 15,1984, at 12).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The court looked at several different factors to determine Alain's intent. Gail
A. Katz, Note, Parpalaix v. CECOS: Protecting Intent in Reproductive Technology, 11
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 683, 686-87 (1998). The fact that no contract existed providing
instructions for any posthumous use of the sperm did not indicate that Alain never
intended for Corinne to use the sperm. Id. Because Corinne and Alain had been married
only two days, the court decided that Alain's parents were the best people to shed light on
the intent of their child. Id. at 687. Because Alain's parents supported Corinne's artificial
insemination using Main's sperm, the court inferred that Alain would also support that
decision. Id. In addition, the court decided that Alain and Corinne presumably married
immediately before his death to make it easier for her to obtain and use his sperm to bear
a child. Id. Finally, Alain had no way of knowing CECOS's policy pertaining to deceased
donor sperm, so the absence of his written consent could not be considered evidence that
he did not consent to use of his sperm after his death. Id. The court concluded that "the
formal will of Corinne's husband to make his wife the mother of a common child" had
been established. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 232 (quoting the GAZETFTE DU
PALAIS, Sept. 15, 1984, at 13). Corinne was finally artificially inseminated with Alain's
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court relied on the Parpalaix analysis to determine that a decedent had a
propertqy interest in sperm, and could bequeath it by will to another
person.
In Hecht v. Superior Court,63 the Court of Appeal of California
considered Parpalaix in deciding whether a decedent's sperm was
property that he could bequeath to his girlfriend.64 In the Hecht case,
William Kane committed suicide and was survived by two older children
from a prior marriage.6 Kane had previously deposited fifteen vials of
sperm in a sperm bank and signed a "Specimen Storage Agreement"
providing that, in the event of his death, the sperm should either
continue to be stored or be released to the executor of his estate,
depending upon the direction of the executor.66 In a provision entitled
"Authorization to Release Specimens," Kane authorized the release of
the sperm to his girlfriend, Deborah Ellen Hecht, or to her physician.67
In his will, Kane named Hecht executor of his estate and bequeathed all
"right, title, and interest" in the sperm to her.68  Kane's will also
expressed his desire for Hecht, should she choose, to become
impregnated with his sperm and bear a child either before or after his
death. '
When, after Kane's death, Hecht attempted to claim his sperm, the
sperm bank refused to release it.7° Kane's children petitioned for an
order to have the sperm destroyed, or, alternatively, have all or most of
the sperm released to them.7' The children argued that the destruction of
sperm one year after he died. Id. at 233. However, due to the small amount and poor
quality of the sperm, Corinne did not become pregnant. Id.
62. Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 855-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
63. Id. at 839-40.
64 Id. at 855-58.




69. Id. Under a section of his will entitled "Statement of Wishes," Kane wrote:
It being my intention that samples of my sperm will be stored at a sperm bank for
the use of Deborah Ellen Hecht, should she so desire, it is my wish that, should
[Hecht] become impregnated with my sperm, before or after my death, she
disregard the wishes expressed in Paragraph 3 above [pertaining to disposition of
decedent's "diplomas and framed mementoes,"] to the extent that she wishes to
preserve any or all of my mementoes and diplomas and the like for our future
child or children.
Id.; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the letter Kane wrote to his
existing children, as well as any future children Hecht might have, about the circumstances
surrounding Kane's death).
70. Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 842.
71. Id. at 843.
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their father's sperm would (1) prevent the birth of children who would
not have an opportunity to know their father or an opportunity to be
raised in a traditional family, and (2) prevent problems in the existing
family by after-born children, as well as prevent "additional emotional,
psychological and financial stress" on existing family members.7
Following a court order allowing the sperm to be destroyed, Hecht filed a
petition to vacate the order.73
The court first considered whether Kane had a property interest in his
sperm, concluding that "the decedent's interest in his frozen sperm vials,
even if not governed by the general law of personal property, occupies
'an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their
potential for human life."' 74 The court explained that "[a]lthough it has
not yet been joined with an egg to form a preembryo ... the value of
sperm lies in its potential to create a child after fertilization, growth, and
birth., 75 According to the court, at the time of Kane's death, he had an
ownership interest in his sperm and had decision-making authority
concerning its use for reproductive purposes; thus, he could determine
the ultimate fate of his sperm.76
Few courts have actually been faced with the question of rights of a
posthumous child who has already been born. In In re Estate of
Kolacy,78 the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate
Part held that, notwithstanding the common law rule to the contrary, two
posthumously conceived children could inherit from the estate of
72. Id. at 844.
73. Id. at 844-45.
74. Id. at 846 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588,597 (Tenn. 1992)).
75. Id. at 850.
76. See id. at 849; Kerekes, supra note 9, at 219. Kane's children argued that the
court should adopt a state policy against posthumous conception, claiming that the
practice essentially creates "orphaned children by artificial means with state
authorization." Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 858. The court noted in response that the
argument is lacking in support to establish that it, or any court, should be responsible for
making the judgment as to whether a potential child should be born, assuming that both
parents want to conceive the child. Id. The court stated:
We also disagree with [the children's] claim that any order other than destruction
of the sperm is tantamount to "state authorization" of posthumous conception of
children, i.e., the creation of public policy in favor of such conception. In such a
case, the state is simply acknowledging that "no other person or entity has an
interest sufficient to permit interference with the [sperm-provider's] decision...
because no one else bears the consequences of these decisions the way that the
[sperm providers] do."
Id. (quoting Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 602).
77. See Sutton, supra note 3, at 893 (noting that, although more posthumous children
are being born, most of the births have not been opposed, resulting in little litigation).
78. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
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William Kolacy as his heirs under the New Jersey intestate laws.79
Kolacy had harvested his sperm after he was diagnosed with leukemia in
case either the disease or the treatment for the disease caused him to
become infertile.8° Kolacy died, and his wife united her eggs with her
deceased husband's sperm through in vitro fertilization.8" Twin girls were
born to Mrs. Kolacy approximately eighteen months after the death of
her husband.2 The Social Security Administration denied dependent's
benefits to the twin girls, based on a determination that the girls were not
children of the decedent.83 Mrs. Kolacy brought an action seeking a
declaration that her twins were among the class of persons considered
the decedent's intestate heirs to support her claim under the Social
Security Act. 4
Based on certifications from Mrs. Kolacy and her doctor, the court
concluded that the twins were "genetically and biologically the children
of [the decedent] William Kolacy." 5 In examining the state intestacy
statute, the court noted a "basic legislative intent to enable children to
take property from their parents and through their parents from parental
relatives."" Although acknowledging that it had not previously dealt
with this specific issue, the court interpreted the general legislative intent
as seeking to provide amply for children of a decedent. Because the
court had already established that the children were the offspring of the
decedent and there were no administrative concerns or competing claims
to the decedent's estate, the court held that the children should be
recognized as William Kolacy's legal heirs under the intestate laws of
New Jersey.m
In most of the opinions dealing with posthumously conceived children,
the courts have either stated or implied that it should be the legislature
that addresses the issues arising from new reproductive technologies. In
Kolacy, in response to the state's argument that courts should not
become involved in the types of issues presented in the case, the court
stated:
[We] think it would be helpful for the Legislature to deal with
these kinds of issues. In the meanwhile, life goes on, and people
79. Id. at 1264.
80. Id. at 1258.
81. Id.
82 Id.
83. Id. at 1259.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1258-59.
86. Id. at 1262.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1262-64.
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come into the courts seeking redress for present problems. We
judges cannot simply put those problems on hold in the hope
that some day (which may never come) the Legislature will deal
with the problem in question.
In a bold move, however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
chose not to wait for the legislature, and devised its own remedy to the
issue of the rights of posthumous children.
D. Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security: The Case That
Could Change It All
In Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security,90 decided in January
of 2002, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered the
question:
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to be
withdrawn from the husband for the purpose of artificially
impregnating the wife, and the woman is impregnated with that
sperm after the man, her husband, has died, will children
resulting from such pregnancy enjoy the inheritance rights of
natural children under Massachusetts' law of intestate
succession? 9'
Lauren and Warren Woodward, a childless married couple, had
decided to withdraw and preserve a quantity of Warren's semen after
being informed that Warren had leukemia and needed treatment that
could leave him sterile. 92 After an unsuccessful bone marrow transplant,
Warren died.93
Two years later, Lauren became artificially impregnated using the
preserved semen and gave birth to twin girls. Within three months of
the girls' birth, Lauren applied for child's survivor benefits and mother's
survivor benefits under the Social Security Act.95 The Social Security Act
89. Id. at 1261. In other cases, courts have shied away from placing limits on the uses
of new reproductive technology, interpreting the legislature's silence as its refusal to
become involved in certain aspects of the issue. The Hecht court noted a statement by the
California Supreme Court in a case involving a surrogacy contract: "[i]t is not the role of
the judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive technology when the Legislature has not
seen fit to do so .... Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)).
90. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
91. Id. at 259.
92. Id. at 260.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. See generally Banks, supra note 5 (discussing the history and mechanics of
Social Security survivor's benefits). Banks examines the question of whether Social
Security survivor's benefits should be made available to posthumously conceived children.
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provides 'child's benefits to dependent children of deceased parents
who die fully insured under the Act." 6  A widow of a fully insured
individual could only receive mother's benefits under the Act if she had a
child or children entitled to child's survivor benefits. 7 The Social
Security Administration denied Lauren's application for benefits and
determined that she had not established that the twins were Warren's
"children" under the Act.98 The Social Security Administration remained
unconvinced, even after Lauren obtained a judgment of paternity and an
order to amend the twins' birth certificates to declare her husband as the
girls' father from the Probate and Family Court.99 A United States
administrative law judge agreed, concluding that the children were not
entitled to inherit from the husband under the intestacy and paternity
laws of Massachusetts and, thus, did not qualify for benefits.'O The
judge's decision was affirmed by the Social Security Administration
appeals council, and Lauren sought a declaratory judgment from the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to reverse
the Administration's ruling.' Because no applicable Massachusetts
precedent existed that could be applied in the case, the United States
District Court judge certified the question to the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts.'
Id. at 257-58. Banks notes that under the Act, there is only one plausible, yet unlikely,
way for posthumously conceived children to qualify for survivor's benefits. Id. at 258.
Banks notes that "[t]he Act presumes paternity and dependency of applicants who qualify
as heirs under the intestate laws of the deceased parent's state of domicile." Id. at 258-59.
Presumably, then, were the states to adopt a method of proving paternity such as the test
set out in Woodward, which is illustrated in the proposed statute, infra Part II, Social
Security survivor's benefits would be easier for posthumously conceived children to
obtain. If the presumption were in favor of the surviving spouse's husband as a parent of a
resulting child, subject to certain requirements of proof by the surviving spouse as set forth
in the proposed statute, paternity of the decedent would be established under state
intestacy law and the child would then qualify for Social Security survivor's benefits.
Banks suggests that one approach to the problem of providing Social Security survivor's
benefits for posthumously conceived children would be to "embark upon a nationwide
campaign to adopt a Uniform Rights of Posthumous[ly] Conceived Children Act." Id. at
259. The other approach would be to amend state paternity and inheritance laws. Id.
96. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260 n.3 (quoting U.S. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
402(d)(1) (1994)).
97. Id. at 260. Under Section 402(g)(1), the U.S. Social Security Act provides
"'mother's benefits to the widow of an individual who died fully insured under the Act, if.
. .she has care of a child or children entitled to child's benefits." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §
402(g)(1) (1994)) (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 260-61.
100. Id. at 261.
101. Id.
102. Id. (stating that "a determination of these children's rights under the law of
Massachusetts is dispositive of the case").
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Noting that no court of last resort had considered the issue of whether
posthumously conceived children were entitled to inheritance rights
under state intestacy laws, the court concluded that, under certain
circumstances, these children could inherit from the deceased parent.' °
The government based its position on common law principles, arguing
that posthumously conceived children are not "in being" at the time of
the parent's death and are thus barred from receiving inheritance
rights.i'O Lauren argued that because the children have a clear genetic
connection to the deceased parent, posthumously conceived children
should always be considered heirs of the deceased parent under intestate
succession laws. 105
The court rejected both arguments and looked to the state intestacy
statute for guidance in answering the question.'O The court examined
three important state interests implicated by the issue before it: "the best
interests of children, the State's interest in the orderly administration of
estates, and the reproductive rights of the genetic parent. ' ' Using these
103. Id. at 272.
104. Id. at 262.
105. Id. Lauren Woodward is quoted in an Associated Press article as saying, "Why
should my children be treated differently from anyone else's children? [Warren] is their
father. That's it. I don't know how much more clear it can be made." Denise Lavoie,
Conception After Dad's Death Blurs Inheritance Law, SOUTH COAST TODAY, Sept. 1,
2001, available at http://www.s-t.com/daily/09-01/09-01-01/a04srO22.htm.
106. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 262. The court noted that the applicable "posthumous
child" provision of the Massachusetts intestacy statute does not specifically limit the class
of posthumous children to those already in utero at the decedent's death. Id. at 262. The
Massachusetts "posthumous child" provision states: "Posthumous children shall be
considered as living at the death of their parent." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 8
(West 2002). The court noted that, although cases relied upon by the administrative law
judge affirmed the general common law principle that heirs are determined at the date of
death, the intestacy statute supersedes any state common law. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at
262 n.10. The court further noted that, although the "posthumous children" provision of
the intestacy statute indicates a legislative intent to preserve wealth for consanguineous
descendants, the legislature left the term "posthumous children" undefined. Id. at 264.
Despite numerous amendments to the Massachusetts intestacy laws, the court recognized
that the "posthumous children" provision has been virtually unchanged for 165 years. Id.
The court contrasted the Massachusetts "posthumous children" provision, which does not
define the term, with a provision of the Louisiana intestacy statute. Id. at 262. The
relevant provision of the Louisiana intestacy statute provides: "A successor must exist at
the death of the decedent." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 939 (West 2000).
107. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264-65. The court first considered the legislative intent
to promote the best interests of children. Id. at 265. The court noted that "'the protection
of minor children, most especially those who may be stigmatized by their "illegitimate"
status,"' is a primary goal of the court as well as the legislature. Id. The court stated that
the legislature has "[r]epeatedly, forcefully, and unequivocally" expressed the idea that
"all children be 'entitled to the same rights and protections of the law' regardless of the
accidents of their birth." Id. According to the court, all children have the right to
financial support from their parents and their parents' estates. Id. The court pointed out
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state interests as guidelines, the court concluded that, in limited
circumstances, a posthumously conceived child may be considered
"issue" of a deceased parent and may receive inheritance rights under
Massachusetts' intestacy law.""' The court noted:
Posthumously conceived children may not come into the world
the way the majority of children do. But they are children
nonetheless. We may assume that the Legislature intended that
such children be "entitled," in so far as possible, "to the same
rights and protections of the law" as children conceived before
death. '
The court formulated two requirements that posthumously conceived
children must meet before enjoying inheritance rights as issue under
intestacy law. In order to receive inheritance rights as issue of a
deceased parent, a genetic link between the posthumously conceived
child and the decedent must be demonstrated. 10  In addition, the
decedent must have consented to posthumous conception and to the
support of any child resulting from the conception.11'
that assisted reproductive technologies making posthumous reproduction possible have
been in existence for a long time, and the legislature has not made any move to narrow the
statutory class of posthumous children to expressly deny them the right to take through
intestacy. Id In addition, the court stated that it has "consistently construed statutes to
effectuate the Legislature's overriding purpose to promote the welfare of all children,
notwithstanding restrictive common-law rules to the contrary." Id. at 266.
The court then considered the legislative purpose of providing certainty to heirs and
creditors by promoting the orderly administration of estates. Id. Allowing a
posthumously conceived child to inherit from a deceased parent automatically reduces the
intestate share available to children born before the decedent's death. Id. The court
acknowledged that the state intestacy statute, by requiring proof of paternity between the
decedent and his issue, and by establishing a limitation on the amount of time during
which a claim may be made against the intestate estate, furthers the legislative purpose.
Id. at 266-67.
The third important state interest focuses on honoring the reproductive choices of
individuals. Id. at 268. The court noted that although "individuals have a protected right
to control use of their gametes, . . . [a] prospective donor parent must clearly and
unequivocally consent ... to posthumous reproduction [and] . . . to the support of any
resulting child." Id. at 269. After the donor-parent's death, the surviving parent bears the
burden of proving affirmative consent by the decedent. Id.
108, Id. at 272.
109. Id. at 266.
110. Id. at 272 (emphasizing that proof of a genetic connection is a "threshold"
matter).
111. Id.
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II. WHY IT IS TIME FOR A CHANGE
As the uses of reproductive technologies expand, so too will the
number of posthumously born children. Because it is possible to
preserve sperm for many years after death, courts will be confronted with
children attempting to assert claims against a decedent's estate long after
the decedent sperm provider has died. Courts are growing tired of
legislative inaction on the issue and are seeking more appropriate
remedies in these cases." The UPA is not sufficient to satisfy this need
and provides a remedy that courts are becoming unwilling to apply. It is
time to change the law's view of posthumous children, and Woodward
provides excellent guidelines for legislatures making these changes.
A. Why Woodward Should Be a Model for Legislatures
While the UPA has the noble goal of protecting the children of
assisted reproductive technologies, the Act falls short of achieving its
stated purpose. While in many respects the Act provides much-needed
legal shelter for these children, it fails to provide protection for a
resulting child in the situation in which a man preserves his sperm to
have a child with his wife, clearly desiring to be the parent of the
resulting child, but dies before the child is born.1 4 Woodward's two-part
requirement addresses this situation while still allowing for the possibility
that the decedent did not intend for his spouse to use his sperm to
112. Id.
113. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' comments
indicating that the time has come for legislatures to address the subject of posthumously
conceived children).
114. See Kerekes, supra note 9, at 222 ("Although the Uniform Parentage Act
provides a clear vehicle for establishing the parent-child relationship, other statutory
provisions are sadly out of synchronization with modem technological advances and deny
rights of succession to persons that the Act determines are children of dead parents.").
One of the most harmful effects of denying posthumous children a legal relationship with
their deceased father may be the lack of resources of the birth family. See Scharman,
supra note 19, at 1024-25. Scharman notes that posthumous children are typically born
into a single-parent home, and it is reasonable to assume that resources will be limited. Id.
Denying a posthumous child inheritance rights and benefits will put even greater strain on
the family. Id. Moreover, Scharman notes that intestate inheritance statutes are intended
to "approximate a decedent's wishes" when that person did not have the opportunity to
express them. Id. at 1025. Because a parent would presumably desire to provide support
for any posthumous children, Scharman argues that an intestate statute denying
inheritance rights to a posthumous child is "inconsistent with the longstanding purpose of
intestate succession . . . . As one commentator has noted, it is 'illogical to assume a
decedent would desire to prevent a genetic child from sharing in the estate."' Id.; see also
Banks, supra note 5, at 375-77 (discussing the possibility of conditioning the "ability to
procreate posthumously on a person's ability and willingness to financially support and
care for resulting children.").
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reproduce after his death." 5 The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills
and Other Donative Transfers supports the Woodward approach."6 The
Restatement adopts the view that a posthumously conceived child should
be considered a child of a decedent husband if born within a reasonable
amount of time after the decedent's death." 7  Woodward's approach,
supported by the Restatement, can be used as a model to correct the
deficiencies in the Uniform Parentage Act.
115. For an interesting look at the situation that arises when a decedent either clearly
opposed posthumous reproduction or where the decedent's intentions are unknown, see
Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising From the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75
N.C. L. REV. 901 (1997). Schiff argues that where a decedent clearly expressed his wish
that his gametes not be used for posthumous reproduction, ignoring the decedent's wishes
would amount to unacceptable coercion. Id. at 945.
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. 1 (1999).
117. Id. The RESTATEMENT has contemplated the situation in which a decedent dies
before conception of a child using his sperm and desires to be a parent of the resulting
child. It presumably supports recognizing as a child, for purposes of inheritance, a child
born by assisted reproductive technologies using the father's sperm, if born within a
reasonable time period after the father's death. It states:
The development of a great variety of reproductive technologies raises the
question of how to treat a child who is produced by some such means. In
general, such a child should be treated as part of the family of the parent or
parents who treat the child as their own and raise the child, one or both of whom
might not be the child's genetic parent. One reproductive technology that does
not raise any legal issue is artificial insemination of a wife with the semen of her
husband, a procedure referred to as artificial insemination by husband (AIH). A
child conceived by this method is the genetic child of both husband and wife....
[T]he traditional view is that a child who is conceived and born after the
decedent's death cannot be an heir. This proposition, however, is open to
reexamination with respect to a child produced from genetic material of the
decedent by assisted reproductive technology. Most statutory codifications...
are not inconsistent with such a reexamination because they do not preclude
inheritance by a child conceived after the decedent's death. They merely provide
that a child who is in gestation at the decedent's death is treated as then living.
This Restatement takes the position that, to inherit from the decedent, a child
produced from genetic material of the decedent by assisted reproductive
technology must be born within a reasonable time after the decedent's death in
circumstances indicating that the decedent would have approved of the child's
right to inherit. A clear case would be that of a child produced by artificial
insemination of the decedent's widow with his frozen sperm. If the AIH
procedure occurs after the husband's death, and if the child is born within a
reasonable time after the husband's death, the child should be treated as the
husband's child for purposes of inheritance from the husband. Once conceived,
such a child is the husband's and wife's child for all purposes of inheritance by,
from, or through an intestate decedent who dies thereafter.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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1. Genetic Connection
Today's technologically advanced medical science allows the first
requirement of the Woodward test to be satisfied easily.'18 The test
provides that a posthumously conceived child may be considered issue of
a decedent where a genetic relationship can be established between the
child and the decedent. 9 DNA tests on the child can establish this
relationship fairly easily.2
2. The Intent and Consent of the Decedent
Judicial decisions have long required proof of the decedent's intent
before enforcing a devise of sperm under a will and before approving a
wife's use of her deceased husband's sperm to conceive a child. 2' In
Parpalaix, the decedent's intent was used to allow a wife to inseminate
herself with her husband's sperm after his death.'22 The court considered
testimony of the decedent's wife and family and found that the decedent
intended to have a child with his wife, even posthumously.'23 The Hecht
court followed the lead of the French court in Parpalaix, which placed
great importance on the decedent's intent, and relied on documents,
118. See Genelex: The Paternity DNA Testing Site, at http://www.genelex.com/
paternitytesting/paternityhome.html (discussing DNA paternity testing and stating that
"DNA testing has made the process [of determining parentage] convenient and the results
conclusive" and that "[in all but the rarest of instances, the DNA test results provide a
level of certainty so high that paternity will, for all practical purposes, be proven or
disproved") (last visited May 8, 2003).
119. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257,259 (Mass. 2002).
120. Id. at 267. The court notes that "sophisticated modern testing techniques now
make the determination of genetic paternity accurate and reliable." Id. DNA testing can
be performed post-mortem to determine paternity. See DNA Diagnostics Center Website
(offering a variety of commercially available DNA paternity tests), at http://www.
dnacenter.com/specialservices.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
121. Sutton, supra note 3, at 900 (noting that the main focus of many posthumous
reproduction cases is to determine the intent of the decedent); see also John L. Gordon,
Note and Comment, Successive Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 18 J. Juv. L.
84, 91 (1997) (discussing courts' focus on intent in cases involving many different kinds of
reproductive technologies). But see Robertson, supra note 9, at 1029-30 (arguing that a
decedent's autonomy over his gametic material should not be the only consideration
involved in posthumous reproduction and arguing that directions for or against
posthumous reproduction deserve much less respect than decisions about reproduction
when a person is alive). See Corvalan, supra note 4, at 351-52 (noting that courts have
found it easier to allow posthumous reproduction when actual evidence of intent exists,
such as explicit or written intent of the decedent's wishes). Corvalan suggests that Hecht
best represents a case in which the decedent's intent is clear because Kane expressed, in
writing and on numerous occasions, his desire for his girlfriend, Deborah, to use his sperm
to conceive a child posthumously. Id. at 351-52; see supra notes 63-76 and accompanying
text (discussing the Hecht case).
122. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
123. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 229-33.
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including the decedent's will, which expressed his intent that his
girlfriend have and use his sperm to conceive a child after his death.'2
4
The second threshold requirement under Woodward provides that the
survivor must establish: (1) that the decedent affirmatively consented to
posthumous conception and (2) that the decedent consented to the
support of any resulting child.'2- Although the Woodward court did not
address whether Lauren Woodward met her burden and proved her
husband's consent to a posthumous child, the court speculated as to what
evidence could be considered to establish her husband's intent.' 26 The
court noted that statements from the decedent's family or records from
the fertility institute that demonstrate the husband's acknowledgement
of the children might be influential in determining consent.' 27 The court
also noted that although a birth certificate can be considered prima facie
evidence of parentage, "genetic and legal parentage are not always
coterminous."' 12'
Courts are unsettled as to what evidence is sufficient to prove evidence
of the decedent's intent and consent to have and to support posthumous
children. 29 It is likely that written statements acknowledging a desire to
124. Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
125. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002).
126. Id. at 270. The court noted the information Lauren Woodward had provided in
her attempt to prove her husband's consent to posthumous children:
In pertinent part, the factual record contains a brief affidavit that [Woodward]
submitted to the Probate Court judge in her action to amend the children's birth
records, a physician's letter that was submitted in that action, and a transcript of
[Woodward's] testimony before the administrative law judge. [Woodward's]
affidavit attests only that [her] husband's sperm was extracted and preserved
"because my husband and I wanted to have children from our union." The two-
sentence notarized physician's letter, addressed to [Woodward's] attorney, was
from the director of Reproductive Endocrinology and Fertility Services of
Maiden Hospital. He wrote that, on February 3, 1995, [Woodward] "had a twin
pregnancy" as a result of her insemination with her husband's "frozen/thawed
semen" and that "we were notified that she delivered twins in October, 1995."
Before the administrative law judge [Woodward] testified only that she and [her]
husband had discussed with doctors whether she would "be able to have
children, [the husband's] children," should [her] husband's bone marrow
transplant not succeed. At the time, the couple had been told that [Warren's]
leukemia treatments might render him sterile, if he survived. [Woodward]
further testified that [her] husband "agreed" with her that "if something should
happen ... I would still be able to have his children."
Id. at 270-71 n.24.
127. Id.
12& Id.; see also BLANK AND MERRICK, supra note 2, at 99-100 (noting that donor
insemination raises questions about paternity because it creates a distinction between
genetic fatherhood and legal fatherhood).
129. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 270-71 (noting that the law is "unsettled" as to what
evidence is required to prove a decedent's intent to have and support a posthumous child).
2003] Posthumous Reproduction and the Uniform Parentage Act 751
conceive a child, even after death, and expressing the decedent's wish to
be a parent of that child would go far in establishing consent'
3°
However, the mere fact that a man preserved his sperm cannot alone
establish his consent to use of the sperm to conceive a child after 
death.1 31
Under existing law, it is clear that more would be required to prove
consent. In addition, because of the surviving spouse's strong
motivation to prove this consent, more evidence will be required than a
simple declaration by the surviving spouse that the decedent wanted
children, even after death. 33 Although some states require a man to sign
It has been argued that statutes dealing with posthumous children should be "worded so as
to require clear evidence of intent and consent, thereby preventing fraud and unwanted
posthumous conceptions, while protecting the rights of those survivors who genuinely
want these children." Sutton, supra note 3, at 925.
130. See Scharman, supra note 19, at 1047-48. Scharman suggests that in the absence
of express intent from the decedent, states should prescribe other factors that could be
used by a posthumous child to establish the decedent's intent. Id. at 1048. Letters, oral
statements, or other preparations that are typically taken by parents hoping for a future
child could be used to establish a person's intent to bear a child, even a posthumous child.
Id. But see Schiff, supra note 115, at 953 (suggesting that it may be unduly burdensome to
individuals in some cases to require a written statement to establish consent to
posthumous reproduction). Schiff argues that a serious, specific, and clear oral statement
showing an individual's desire to procreate posthumously should be regarded as sufficient
to prove consent. Id. at 953.
131. Schiff, supra note 115, at 950. Schiff notes:
[W]hile there may be a general intent to procreate in the future and to do so by
employing technological means, the act of cryopreservation, by itself, does not
provide evidence of an intent to procreate under all and any circumstances,
including after death. For example, it is quite likely that a person may store
gametes in anticipation of undergoing chemotherapy, with the aim of using those
gametes if the treatment were successful in controlling the disease. It cannot be
concluded, however, that the individual has acquiesced to what is arguably an
entirely different set of circumstances, namely that a child should be brought into
existence when one of the biological parents is deceased.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
132 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 271 ("It is undisputed.., that the husband is the
genetic father of the wife's children. However .... that fact, in itself, cannot be sufficient
to establish that the husband is the children's legal father for purposes of the devolution
and distribution of his intestate property."). But cf In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257,
1263-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) ("[G]iven the facts of this case, including
particularly the fact that William Kolacy by his intentional conduct created the possibility
of having long-delayed after born children ... it is entirely fitting to recognize that [the
children] are the legal heirs of William Kolacy...."). Many legal scholars have addressed
the issue of what should be required to prove consent to posthumous reproduction. Some
have argued for a "clear and convincing" standard of proof in these cases, preferring
stronger evidence of intent in light of the potential conflict of interests that may arise
within a family struggling with these issues. Schiff, supra note 115, at 953.
133. See Schiff, supra note 115, at 950-51. Schiff argues:
If the deceased's interests are to be safeguarded adequately in posthumous
reproduction, a high standard of evidence of an intent to reproduce after death
ought to be required. The risk exists in these cases.., that a family member may
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a consent form before the preservation of his sperm, these forms may or
may not include a provision authorizing the surviving spouse to use the
preserved sperm in the event of the provider's death. Moreover, these
forms would not be helpful in determining whether the decedent
consented to the support of any children produced after death, although
apply his or her own values, rather than attempt to ascertain what the individual
would have wanted .... [T]he temptation may be very great for family members
to portray the deceased's values and desires regarding posthumous conception in
ways that serve their own interests in procreation.
Id. at 953. But cf Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1263 ("I accept as true Mariantonia Kolacy's
statement that her husband unequivocally expressed his desire that she use his stored
sperm after his death to bear his children.").
134. See Michelle L. Brenwald & Kay Redeker, A Primer on Posthumous Conception
and Related Issues of Assisted Reproduction, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 599, 633 (1999).
Brenwald and Redeker note that "[s]tandardized consent forms pose one of the largest
problems for attorneys in this area." Id. at 633. Further, the authors argue:
One initial document in which consent should be scrutinized is the agreement
between the couple and the reproductive clinic with which they are working. If
the consent form lacks certain provisions, questions arise, such as how to dispose
of the sperm after a specific time period, who is the owner of the sperm (clinic
versus couple), and what is done with the remaining sperm after the wife has
conceived. An attorney should be prepared to draft an independent contract on
these matters, particularly if the couple wishes to affirm the desire for a potential
posthumous child.
Id. at 634. If properly drafted, however, it can be speculated that these consent forms
would assist the surviving spouse in meeting the requirement under Woodward that the
decedent affirmatively consented to use of his sperm to conceive a child after his death.
See THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 315.
With respect to disposition of frozen gametes, the Task Force concluded:
New York's gamete bank regulations should require gamete banks to ask
individuals storing gametes for future use with an intimate partner to specify
their instructions for disposition of their gametes after death .... The regulations
should require gamete banks to use their best efforts to ensure that any gametes
remaining in storage after the depositor's death are disposed of in accordance
with the depositor's instructions.
Id. The Task Force further noted:
Most of the dilemmas surrounding the posthumous use of gametes stored for
future use with an intimate partner can be avoided by requiring, at the time the
gametes are frozen, specific instructions for the disposition of any gametes
remaining after death .... The available options should include.., release to a
specific person (identified either by name or in general terms, such as "my wife
at the time of my death") ....
Id. at 315; see also Scharman, supra note 19, at 1047 (encouraging states to establish a
formal method for fathers to indicate, at the time of preservation of sperm, their intent to
conceive a child and also to claim a legal relationship with the child by specifying whether
they want their sperm used posthumously to conceive a child and by whom); ASRM
Website, supra note 4 (noting that many assisted reproduction programs use consent
forms that provide instructions for use of gametes and embryos after the death of the
donor and stating that "[p]rograms are urged to insist that donors make their wishes
known").
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consent forms could be expanded to include a provision relating to
support of any resulting child.
135
B. Anticipated Problems Under Woodward
Whether a posthumous child is considered a child, and therefore, issue
of a deceased parent, is most relevant in determining whether that child
will be able to inherit from the decedent and receive benefits as the
decedent's child.1 6 Several problems could foreseeably arise as a result
of using the two-part Woodward test to allow a posthumous child to be
considered a child of the decedent and enjoy inheritance rights as the
decedent's issue. Legal scholars have long warned of the dangers arising
under the Rule Against Perpetuities, especially the risk that a child could
assert a claim to a decedent's estate many years after the decedent's
death. 37 The Rule provides that a gift creating a conditional future
interest is not valid unless it must vest within a life in being at the time of
the creation of the interest plus twenty-one years.1m The Rule was
designed to prevent future gifts that could possibly vest (e.g., become
certain as to the identity of the taker) at remote times in the future.
1 39
Because cryopreservation allows sperm to be preserved for an
undetermined length of time, there is a fear that a claim against a
decedent's estate could arise many years in the future, preventing
efficient administration of estates. In the case of a posthumously
conceived child, however, this argument is not valid. By using the life of
the surviving spouse as the "measuring life," a gift to a posthumously
135. See Brenwald & Redeker, supra note 134, at 635-36 ("One possible solution
would be requiring all facilities that store sperm to require donors to sign a specific intent
form, which allows for some flexibility or personalization.").
136. See THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 6,
at 341; Sutton, supra note 3, at 914; see also Banks, supra note 5, at 302. When examining
the best interests of the unconceived child, Banks notes:
Some administrative accommodation for posthumously conceived children in
their pursuit of survivor's benefits is reasonable. As it stands, the Act virtually
excludes them as a subclass from benefiting from their own deceased parent's
actual contributions into a social retirement insurance program. Unconceived, as
well as unborn, children understandably have some degree of moral expectancy
of being supported by their predeceased biological or intended progenitors.
Banks, supra note 5, at 302.
137. See Sutton, supra note 3, at 916.
138. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 291 (4th ed. 1998) (citing
JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942)).
139. Id. at 292.
140. See Sutton, supra note 3, at 916; Djalleta, supra note 3, at 366. See generally Les
A. McCrimmon, Gametes, Embryos and the Life in Being: The Impact of Reproductive
Technology on the Rule Against Perpetuities, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2000)
(examining the possibility of treating the embryo as a life in being when considering issues
of reproductive technology and the Rule Against Perpetuities).
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conceived child would necessarily have to vest within twenty-one years
after the mother's death because, in instances of married couples, the
surviving spouse would be the only person with a desire to bear the
child.'1
4
As provided in the USCACA, a person who preserves his sperm is free
to include a provision in his will indicating that, in the event of death, any
child conceived using that sperm should inherit as his child.42 This is, of
course, the easiest method to provide for posthumous children. The Act,
however, fails to consider a situation where the decision to preserve
sperm might have been last-minute, prompted by a fear that a given
medical treatment might result in sterility. This solution also fails to
141. See Sutton, supra note 3, at 916.
142. UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION Acr § 4 cmt.
(1988). Professor Winthrop Thies suggested that a person attempting to plan for
circumstances in which posthumous conception could be a possibility should provide for a
specific procedure in his will. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4, at 245. Thies
suggested the will should include a provision instructing that
[a]fter each artificial insemination treatment, both the widow and the physician
should make an affidavit swearing that the treatment was performed using the
testator's sperm. If the procedure is successful, the widow, doctor, and hospital
should be required to file a second affidavit within 120 days of the birth of the
child stating the birth date, the name and sex, and whether the child survived 90
days. If the child so survives, it will be deemed the testator's child and may
inherit according to the will.
Id. at 245 n.124. Thies explains that the will may designate other survival periods and
suggests that the will should set limits on the number of births. Id. One commentator has
proposed an amendment to the Uniform Probate Code to reflect a requirement that a
posthumous child will not be able to inherit from the decedent unless it is expressed in the
decedent's will. Djalleta, supra note 3, at 369-70. Djalleta's proposed amendment to the
Uniform Probate Code reads: "A child resulting from the in utero implantation of an
embryo created by the union of the testator's sperm or ovum with another gamete, after
the testator's death, shall not receive a share of the testator's estate unless specifically
provided for in the will." Id. at 370. Djalleta also discusses imposition of a statute of
limitations for claims against a decedent's estate as a possible solution to the problem of a
posthumous child attempting to assert a claim many years in the future. Id. at 365; see also
Brenwald and Redeker, supra note 134, at 651 (recommending that an attorney instruct
his client to indicate specifically in his will the desired method of disposition of preserved
sperm). But see Evelyne Shuster, The Posthumous Gift of Life. The World According to
Kane, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 401, 414 (1999). Shuster points out that a
provision in a will providing for posthumous children may serve to promote a view that
women are "reducible to their reproductive functions" by creating a feeling of obligation
in a widow to use the sperm left behind by her husband. Id. ("Because women are
subjected to all sorts of psychological, cultural, and societal pressure to be mothers, the
gift-exchange of sperm creates a strong moral, psychological, and social imperative on
some women to want, or at least appear to want, the ability to bear children.")
143. Numerous Websites dedicated to cancer and cancer treatment recommend that a
male preserve sperm before undergoing chemotherapy. See UPMC Cancer Centers,
Cancer Information, at http://www.upmccancercenters.com/cainformation/chemotherapy.
html (last modified Jan. 13, 2003); The Royal Marsden Hospital, Patient Information, at
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address a situation of unexpected death, after a husband and wife have
preserved sperm for later use. In this case, the couple may not have
considered, or have had reason to consider, the possibility of a desire to
procreate after the death of one of them. It is evident why a blanket
statutory statement stating that a person may provide for a posthumous
child in his will simply does not cover every situation in which a
posthumous child may be born.'
III. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY CHANGE
It is clear that a change regarding the law's treatment of posthumous
children would be best received if it came from the legislature.14  Some
hoped that the UPA or another statute would address the issue.146 While
http://www.royalmarsden.org/patientinfo/booklets/chemotherapy/sexuality.asp (last visited
Apr. 10, 2003); Infertility and IVF Center, Cryopreservation, at http://www.ivfctrstl.
org/cryo-who.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
144. See Scharman, supra note 19, at 1024 (noting that the USCACA's provision may
provide relief for some because it allows a person who wishes to provide for a posthumous
child to do so in a will, but overall, this approach may not be effective because most
people die intestate); Kerekes, supra note 9, at 225-26. Kerekes notes that those who most
logically would be inclined to use the sperm preservation method are relatively young
persons, who may not consider estate planning a priority. Kerekes, supra note 9, at 225-
26. Kerekes further explains that, even if a will exists, a bequest to 'my issue,' 'the heirs
of my body,' or even 'my children,' might fail in the face of every definition that excludes a
conceived child." Id. at 226.
145. Berry, supra note 4, at 256. Berry notes:
Historically, courts have refused or failed to address public policy issues of new
reproductive technologies. As quickly as courts deal with one issue of new
reproductive technology, a new technology is developed which creates even
more complicated issues. These new technologies continue to wreak havoc with
probate proceedings, parentage, and procreative constitutional issues. Two
classes of citizens, whose rights have been given limited attention, are (1)
children born of the new reproductive technologies and (2) minor children whose
inheritance rights may be affected by future siblings born from the frozen sperm
of their deceased fathers .... Lawmakers ... must grasp the magnitude of the
problems associated with new reproductive technologies. They must.., begin to
develop a cogent public policy .... [C]omprehensive legislation must be drafted
to address not only the rights of individuals, but also the rights of children who,
through no fault of their own, often become victims of new reproductive
technology rather than beneficiaries.
Id. (footnote omitted); see Sutton, supra note 3, at 922-25. Sutton argues that "any statute
that attempts to notably limit the availability of reproductive assistance, or to restrict when
or how a child may be conceived or provided for, might be held to the constitutional strict
scrutiny standard, [which] few statutes pass." Id. at 923 (footnote omitted). Sutton
predicts that cases involving assisted conception and posthumously conceived children will
inevitably reach the Supreme Court because the constitutional issues surrounding them
have not been adequately addressed by lower courts. Id. at 924.
146. See Sutton, supra note 3, at 929 (calling the Uniform Parentage Act "not nearly
comprehensive enough"). The Uniform Rights of the Posthumously Conceived Child Act
was proposed in 1971 by Professor Winthrop Thies. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 4,
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the JPA failed to provide the needed guidance for states on the issue of
posthumously conceived children, it is not too late. Woodward clearly
illustrates the need for a different statutory stance on the issue. A statute
is necessary to guide state legislatures in providing for these children.
Woodward also provides a sound starting point for a statute addressing
the issue of posthumously conceived children. The threshold
requirements set out in the decision reflect careful analysis of judicial
decisions before it, with a focus on the decedent's intent and consent as
key to determining whether a posthumously conceived child may be
considered a child of a decedent. Although it is far from a perfect
solution to the problems raised by the issue of posthumous children,
Woodward provides the necessary impetus for statutory change in this
area.
Building upon the language of the existing UPA, a statutory
amendment to the Act reflecting the reasoning and requirements of
Woodward might provide:
A husband who provides for, or consents to, assisted
reproduction by his wife is the father of a resulting child.
If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos,
the deceased spouse may be considered a parent of the resulting
child for purposes of benefits and inheritance only if:
at 244. Thies argued that the Act should include provisions for many circumstances that
are still at issue today, such as rights of a posthumously conceived child when the decedent
has provided for the child in his will and rights of the child where the will is silent. Id. at
244-45 n.123. Thies also proposed a "cut-off" point, providing how late after the
decedent's death a child could be born and still be protected under the Act. Id.; see also
Kerekes, supra note 9, at 245-49.
Kerekes sets forth a Proposed Uniform Status of Posthumously Conceived Children
Act, in which he attempts to introduce new standards for determining paternity of a
posthumously conceived child. Kerekes, supra note 9, at 245-49. The proposed statute
reads, in relevant part:
[A] posthumously conceived child shall be the child of the donors of the gametic
material that resulted in the birth of the child. In making a determination as to
whether a child is the genetic child of a purported parent, the court shall
consider, but not be limited to, relevant scientific test results, the testimony of
the custodian of the frozen gametic material or pre-embryo, and the testimony of
the licensed medical personnel who participated in the assisted posthumous
conception.
Id. at 248. Kerekes proposes a five-year time limit during which a posthumously
conceived child may request a determination of his status as a posthumously conceived
child. Id. The proposed statute further provides that if a child is determined to be a
posthumous child of a decedent within the applicable time period, "the child shall share in
the distribution of the estate either pursuant to the will or in accordance with the
governing intestate statute." Id. at 248-49. If stored gametic material is used after the
limitations period has run under the statute, a child conceived from the material will "have
no claim as a child of the deceased donor of the gametic material." Id. at 249.
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(a) The deceased spouse consented in a record, on file with the
providing sperm bank, or the physician who performed the
artificial insemination procedure, that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a
parent of the resulting child, or
(b) The surviving spouse, who seeks support for a biological
child of her own, conceived with the decedent's sperm, can
prove the following:
That there is a genetic relationship between the deceased
spouse and the child, and
That the deceased spouse consented to conception after death
and to the support of any resulting child.
The surviving spouse may prove this consent by providing clear
and convincing evidence of the decedent's oral or written
statements concerning the conception and support of a child
after death.' 47
A statute that includes provisions such as these should provide a
reasonable time limit, such as two years, during which the sperm could be
used to conceive a child. 48 Any child born after the conclusion of the
time limit would be barred from asserting any claims against the
decedent's estate.' 49 This type of provision would protect any children
born before the decedent's death from the risk of future claims, beyond a
reasonable period, which might diminish their inheritance; in essence,
this rule would allow the estate to be administered in a more efficient
fashion.'9
147. This proposed amendment to the UPA is written using language from the existing
UPA, combined with the requirements set forth in the Woodward case. See infra Part I.D
and accompanying notes (discussing the Woodward decision); see also infra Parts II-I1
and accompanying notes (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of adopting the
Woodward approach as the new approach to determining rights of posthumously
conceived children).
148. See Sutton, supra note 3, at 926. Sutton suggests retaining a certain percentage of
a decedent's estate in trust to be held for a specified length of time. Id. If no child is born
within that period, the portion held in trust would be returned to the estate and distributed
accordingly. Id.; see also Corvalan, supra note 4, at 364. Corvalan suggests that in cases
where a decedent's intent is clear, any resulting children should not be classified as
illegitimate but should be allowed to inherit through a will or by receiving an intestate
share. Corvalan, supra note 4, at 364. Corvalan further recommends, however, that a two-
year time limitation should be imposed in order to effectuate an efficient distribution of
the decedent's estate. Id. Corvalan notes that because "these 'clear intent' children are
not illegitimate, the federal and state governments should not be allowed to deny these
children entitlements." Id.
149. See Corvalan, supra note 4, at 364.
150. See id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the efforts of legislatures to keep pace with new reproductive
technology, the UPA fails to address adequately the issues surrounding
posthumously conceived children, and thus, fails to provide fundamental
guidance to state legislatures and courts in this area. Past judicial
decisions indicate the courts' desire to effectuate the decedent's intent
and afford rights to a posthumously conceived child where the intent
clearly indicates a desire to conceive a child, even after death.
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security provides an excellent
starting point for new statutory guidelines regarding posthumously
conceived children and should be used as a tool to create new legislation.
Reproductive technologies are evolving. It is necessary for the UPA to
change as well as provide a strong model for state legislatures in this
difficult area of the law. Until the legislature speaks, when attempting to
deal with these issues, courts will be forced to draw upon scattered
judicial opinions and statutes lacking necessary provisions.' 1 In addition,
151. The Woodward court noted:
As these technologies advance, the number of children they produce will
continue to multiply. So, too, will the complex moral, legal, social, and ethical
questions that surround their birth. The questions present in this case cry out for
lengthy, careful examination outside the adversary process, which can only
address the specific circumstances of each controversy that presents itself. They
demand a comprehensive response reflecting the considered will of the people.
Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002) (emphasis added);
see also Berry, supra note 4, at 253. Berry remarks:
New reproductive technology continues to confound courts, legislators, and
social science commentators. Until legislators act, courts will be called upon to
patch together remedies which may not be in the best interest of the litigants or
to create sound public policy on behalf of children born from these new
technologies.
Berry, supra note 4, at 253.
Most recently, in October of 2002, the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona was confronted with the dilemma of whether to afford Social Security survivor's
benefits to a posthumously conceived child. Gillett-Netting v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 231 F.
Supp. 961, 963 (D. Ariz. 2002). As is commonly the case, a man preserved sperm before
undergoing chemotherapy treatments for cancer. Id. The man died, and his wife was
inseminated with his sperm almost a year after his death; his wife later gave birth to twins.
Id. The wife applied for Social Security survivor's benefits on behalf of the twins, and
after several of her appeals were denied, she brought the matter before the court seeking
judicial review of the denials. Id. at 964. The court applied Arizona intestacy law and
determined that because the children were not in gestation at the time of the husband's
death, they could not inherit from the deceased husband. Id. at 966-67. Although the wife
claimed that the purpose of intestacy law is to effectuate the decedent's intent and that her
husband intended for her to bear his children even after his death, the court held that the
decedent's intent is not a factor in determining distribution of a decedent's estate. Id. The
court distinguished Woodward, explaining that the posthumous child provision of the
Massachusetts' intestacy statute in that case did not specifically require that children be in
existence at the date of the decedent's death. Id. at 967-68. In contrast, the Arizona
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as reproductive technologies advance, the possibility that children could
be born to a widow using her deceased husband's sperm long after the
husband has died will continue to plague courts, as these children seek
benefits and inheritance rights as children of the deceased parent. Until
the legislature takes the necessary steps to provide for posthumously
conceived children, these children will be left not only without a parent,
but also without the opportunity to enjoy recognition and rights as a
child of that deceased parent.
intestacy statute contains no posthumous child provision and specifically requires that to
be an heir of a decedent, the child must be in gestation at the time of the decedent's death.
Id. at 968. The court ultimately held that the twins were not eligible for Social Security
survivor's benefits as children of their deceased father because they were not in gestation
at the time of his death. Id. 970. This case clearly shows the need for a new statutory
stance on the issue of posthumous children and poignantly illustrates courts' reluctance to
apply new law until they have legislative guidance. It also demonstrates the need to
change the existing UPA in order to provide effective guidance to state legislatures in
moving forward on a path of change. See infra Part III and accompanying notes
(proposing an amendment to the UPA that reflects the reasoning and requirements set
forth in the Woodward case).
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